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EXPLAINING CHANGE AND
RETHINKING DIRTY WORDS: FCC v.
FOX TELEVISION STATIONS, INC.
TOBY COLEMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION
Everybody curses these days, including President Bush.1 Does that
mean that it is no longer reasonable to consider television programs
2
that include the “F-Word” indecent? The Supreme Court faces that
quandary in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.3 The FCC has
declared “fleeting and isolated” utterances of the words “fuck” and
4
“shit” indecent, and is fighting to keep its new fleeting-expletives
policy in place after the Second Circuit Court of Appeals struck it
5
down. The Second Circuit rejected the FCC’s new policy on
administrative law grounds: it held that the FCC had not provided a
reasoned explanation for changing its fleeting-expletives policy.6
The Supreme Court must now decide whether the FCC could
reasonably conclude that non-literal uses of the F-Word are offensive
enough to be indecent. To make that decision, the Court will need to
clarify confusion about the leeway agencies have under the

* 2010 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 459 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128
S. Ct. 1647 (2008) (noting that President Bush once commented that the United Nations needed
to “get Syria to get Hezbollah to stop doing this shit”).
2. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar.
8, 2005 (Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299, 13,303 (2006) (the term “F-Word” used to avoid
repeating the word “fuck”); see generally THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 683
(2001) (defining the word “fuck” and noting that, “[u]ntil relatively recently, it rarely appeared
in print; even today, there are a number of euphemistic ways of referring to it in speech and
writing, e.g. the F-word, f***, or f—k”).
3. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (U.S. argued Nov. 4, 2008).
4. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13,306–11.
5. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 462.
6. Id. at 458–62.
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Administrative Procedure Act7 (APA) to change long-standing
policies. In its decision, the Second Circuit limited the FCC’s ability to
change long-standing policies by presuming that the FCC’s old policy
of tolerating fleeting expletives was correct unless the FCC presented
“evidence” proving otherwise.8 By demanding a special explanation
for the policy change, the Second Circuit extended the scope of its
judicial review beyond the bounds authorized by the APA, which only
allows courts to strike down unreasonable agency explanations.9 In
reviewing the Second Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court will
probably use a more limited scope of review and reject the Second
Circuit’s problematic presumption that it was unreasonable to classify
non-literal uses of the F-Word as indecent.
II. FACTS
The FCC announced in 2004 that it could, and would, sanction
broadcasters for airing “fleeting and isolated” expletives.10 The
announcement marked an about-face by the FCC, which had spent
the previous twenty-five years rejecting claims that fleeting expletives
were indecent.11
The FCC announced its new fleeting-expletives policy in March
2004,12 a month after Janet Jackson bared her right breast during
Superbowl XXXVIII as a result of a “wardrobe malfunction.”13
Complaints about indecent programming had increased ninefold, and

7. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 46-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
8. See Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 461 (“The FCC’s decision, however, is devoid of any
evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful, let alone establishes that this harm is
serious enough to warrant government regulation.”).
9. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2) (West 2007) (requiring courts
to “set aside agency action” that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with the law”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co.,
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (requiring agencies to provide “reasoned basis” for acting in order to pass
the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious test).
10. In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globes), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4975–79 (2004).
11. See Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 461 (noting broadcasters had relied on the FCC’s previous
“restrained approach” to indecency enforcement); CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir.
2008) (summarizing the FCC’s long history of explaining “that isolated or fleeting material did
not fall within the scope of actionable indecency”).
12. Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4975.
13. CBS, 535 F.3d at 171–72; Kalefah Sanneh, During Halftime Show, a Display Tailored
for Video Review, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2004, at D4.
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the FCC was trying to hone its “enforcement blade.”14 The FCC’s first
target was NBC, which had broadcast an awards show in which U2
singer Bono had used the phrase “really fucking brilliant” during an
15
award-acceptance speech. Under the FCC’s old policy, such a
fleeting expletive would not have been indecent because Bono had
only said the F-Word once.16 The FCC, however, claimed that it had to
change its fleeting-expletives policy “to safeguard the well-being of
the nation’s children from the most objectionable, most offensive
language.”17 Accordingly, it held that the F-Word, even when only said
18
once, was vulgar and shocking enough to be indecent.
A number of broadcasters felt the sting of the FCC’s new policy.
In an omnibus review of shows between 2002 and 2005, the FCC
declared indecent Fox’s live broadcast of the 2002 Billboard Music
19
Awards, in which Cher said “fuck ‘em”; it declared indecent Fox’s
live broadcast of the 2003 Billboard Music Awards, in which realty
show star Nicole Richie observed that “it’s not so fucking simple” to
get “cow shit out of a Prada purse”;20 and it declared indecent a 2004
broadcast of the CBS’s “The Early Show,” in which a contestant on
the reality show “Survivor: Vanuatu” used the word “bullshitter”
during an interview.21 (The FCC later reversed its “Early Show” ruling
because it worried that punishing news programs for indecency could
22
create some First Amendment problems. ) Broadcasters complained
that the FCC’s indecency rules had become unpredictable and
inconsistent.23 Even as the FCC banned fleeting expletives, it let CBS

14. The Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2004: Hearings on H.R. 3717 Before the
Subcomm. on Telecommunications and the Internet of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce,
108th Cong. 78–79 (2004) (statement of Michael K. Powell, Chairman, FCC); see also FCC,
Indecency Complaints and NALs: 1993–2006, http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/ComplStatChart.pdf
(showing that indecency complaints skyrocketed from 166,683 in 2003 to 1.4 million in 2004).
15. Golden Globes, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4976 n.4.
16. Id. at 4980.
17. Id. at 4979.
18. Id.
19. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar.
8, 2005 (Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299, 13,322–23 (2006).
20. Id. at 13,303–06.
21. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar.
8, 2005, 21 F.C.C.R. 2664, 2698–99 (2006).
22. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13,327–28.
23. See, e.g., Mike Musgrove, Sinclair Puts 9/11 Show in Late Night Time Slots, WASH.
POST, Sept. 2, 2006, at D1, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/01/AR2006090101528.html (noting that CBS affiliates refused to air
an “important” 9/11 documentary in prime time because it contained expletives, which made it
“a risk” given the “uncertainty and potential level of fines”).
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air an unedited version of “Saving Private Ryan” because the curse
words were “integral” to conveying the “horrors of war.”24
Fox Television Stations, Inc., and other broadcast networks
25
challenged the FCC’s new fleeting-expletives policy. In an appeal to
the Second Circuit, Fox argued (1) that the FCC had arbitrarily and
capriciously instituted the new policy in violation of section 706(2)(A)
of the APA and (2) that the new policy unconstitutionally restricted
speech protected by the First Amendment.26
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
When the FCC changes its broadcast indecency policy, it must
clear both administrative law and constitutional law hurdles.27 The
reviewing court will resolve the administrative law claim first by
examining the new policy to see if it passes the APA’s arbitrary-andcapricious test.28 The arbitrary-and-capricious test is based on §
706(2)(A) of the APA, which requires reviewing courts to strike down
agency decisions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with the law.” The ultimate touchstone
during arbitrary-and-capricious review is “reasoned” explanation.29
Once an agency provides a reasoned explanation, the reviewing court
30
cannot strike down the agency’s policy as arbitrary and capricious.
The line between a reasoned explanation and an inadequate
explanation is ill-defined but important. Generally, a reasoned
explanation outlines why an agency made a change and on what
31
authority it is relying to make that change. An explanation can fall

24. In re Complaints Against Various Television Licensees Regarding Their Broad. on
Nov. 11, 2004, of the ABC Television Network’s Presentation of the Film “Saving Private
Ryan,” 20 F.C.C.R. 4507, 4512–13 (2005).
25. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 454 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128
S. Ct. 1647 (2008).
26. Id.
27. CBS Corp. v. FCC, 535 F.3d 167, 174 (3d Cir. 2008); Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 462;
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT), 852 F.2d 1332, 1337–38 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
28. See, e.g., CBS, 535 F.3d at 174 (beginning review of a new FCC policy by asking if it
passes the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious test).
29. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
30. See id. at 42–43 (acknowledging that courts cannot strike down agency rules that are
“rational, based on consideration of the relevant factors, and within the scope of the authority
delegated to the agency by statute”).
31. See, e.g., id. at 43 (requiring agencies “to examine the relevant data and articulate a
satisfactory explanation” that makes a “‘rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made’” (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962))).
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short of the reasoned requirement for any number of reasons,
including inconsistent logic, failure to consider material factors, or
“implausible” reasoning.32 Because a number of considerations
determine whether an explanation is reasoned enough to pass
administrative review, the APA places few concrete limits on the
scope of judicial review.33 But the limits that exist are steadfast.
Courts, for instance, cannot demand more of agencies than Congress
34
requires. Congress sets the rules the agencies must follow, the courts
can only “impose” them.35 Judicial rulemaking is rarely allowed.
Differentiating between demands for explanation, on the one
hand, and judicial rulemaking, on the other, becomes particularly
difficult in cases involving changes to long-standing agency policies.36
Courts presume that old policies endure because the old policies carry
out the agencies’ Congressionally-authorized missions.37 In essence,
the old policies’ longevity makes them presumptively reasonable.
Because of that presumption, both the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals
and the Second Circuit have concluded that agencies wanting to
change policies must explain why change is warranted to survive
administrative review.38

32. Id. at 43.
33. See Puerto Rico Sun Oil Co. v. EPA, 8 F.3d 73, 77 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The arbitrary and
capricious concept, needless to say, is not easy to encapsulate in a single list of rubrics because it
embraces a myriad of possible faults and depends heavily upon the circumstances of the case.”);
Patricia M. Wald, Judicial Review in Midpassage: The Uneasy Partnership Between Courts and
Agencies Plays On, 32 TULSA L.J. 221, 233–34 (1996) (surveying 135 APA cases decided by the
D.C. Circuit and concluding that it is hard “to quantify or even explicate” what makes an agency
explanation inadequate); Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Judicial Incentives and
Indeterminacy in Substantive Review of Administrative Decisions, 44 DUKE L.J. 1051, 1065–68
(1995) (surveying 118 cases and finding that the definition of “arbitrary and capricious” in §
706(2)(A) is indeterminate).
34. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524
(1978) (“Agencies are free to grant additional procedural rights in the exercise of their
discretion, but reviewing courts are generally not free to impose them if the agencies have not
chosen to grant them. This is not to say necessarily that there are no circumstances which would
ever justify a court in overturning agency action because of a failure to employ procedures
beyond those required by the statute. But such circumstances, if they exist, are extremely
rare.”).
35. Id.
36. Compare Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 461 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008) (demanding evidence that the FCC needed to change its fleetingexpletives policy is demanding a reasoned explanation), with id. at 473 (Leval, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the majority’s decision to strike down the FCC’s new fleeting-expletives policy as “a
difference of opinion between a court and an agency”).
37. State Farm, 463 U.S. at 41–42.
38. See N.Y. Council, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d
502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985) (requiring agencies to provide “a reasoned explanation of why the new
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After the FCC’s new policy survives administrative review, it is
subjected to constitutional review.39 The FCC, however, has broad
power to regulate speech on broadcast television,40 and, as a result, it
41
does not have to wrestle with the First Amendment concerns that
42
government indecency regulations normally create. This is because
broadcast networks receive less First Amendment protection due to
their “uniquely pervasive” reach into the American home with
programming that is “uniquely accessible to children, even those too
young to read.”43
The Supreme Court has never decided whether regulating fleeting
expletives is constitutional.44 The FCC has long believed that it could
regulate fleeting expletives to some degree, and nothing in the law
45
contradicts the FCC’s interpretation. Because the FCC has general
authority to sanction broadcast indecency,46 it arguably also has the
specific authority to regulate fleeting expletives.
IV. HOLDING
In Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, a divided Second Circuit
panel struck down the FCC’s new fleeting-expletives policy. The court
determined that the policy-change lacked a reasoned explanation and

rule effectuates the statute as well or as better than the old rule”); Brae Corp. v. United States,
740 F.2d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (requiring agencies to “explain why the original reasons for
the rule or policy are no longer dispositive”).
39. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT), 852 F.2d 1332, 1338 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (examining the constitutional challenge to a new FCC policy after concluding that the new
policy passed the arbitrary-and-capricious test).
40. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867–70 (1997) (prohibiting the federal government
from policing the internet for indecency in the same way the FCC patrols broadcast television);
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) (explaining that the FCC can impose speech
limits on broadcast media that it cannot impose on newspapers or other mediums).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
42. See, e.g., Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748 (noting that the government cannot usually license
speakers or impose equal-time requirements).
43. Id. at 748–49.
44. Id. at 750; id. at 760–61 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1464 (West 2000) (permitting punishment for broadcasting “any . . .
indecent . . . language”); 47 U.S.C.A. § 326 (West 2001) (prohibiting the FCC from engaging in
censorship); Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (ACT), 852 F.2d 1332, 1339 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (holding that the FCC could broaden its definition of broadcast indecency); In re Industry
Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement
Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8009–10 (2001) (listing examples of
when fleeting expletives have been found indecent).
46. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750 (approving a broadcast indecency regime “under which
context is all-important”).
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that it therefore failed the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious test.47 As a
result, the court did not decide whether the new policy was
unconstitutional.48 In dicta, however, the majority indicated that it
would declare the new policy unconstitutionally vague if the case
49
came before it again.
The majority rejected the FCC’s new fleeting-expletives policy
50
because it presumed the FCC’s old policy was correct. The majority
read the APA as requiring more than merely a reasoned explanation
for changing policy: it read the APA as requiring the FCC to show
why a new policy was needed. To do that, the FCC needed to provide
evidence that fleeting expletives were a problem requiring
government oversight51 in order to overcome the presumption that
fleeting expletives, particularly non-literal uses of “fuck” and “shit,”
were not harmful.52 The majority based this presumption on the FCC’s
twenty-five year record of rejecting claims that fleeting expletives
53
were indecent.
The majority searched for evidence justifying the FCC’s new
fleeting-expletives policy and came up empty-handed. The FCC
changed its fleeting-expletives policy because the old policy clashed
with its context-sensitive approach to indecency enforcement by
54
making a single factor—the number of expletives—determinative.
But the FCC failed to provide adequate justification or evidence that
such a change was necessary. It neither evaluated whether the words
“fuck” and “shit” had become more offensive since 1978,55 nor

47. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 457–62.
48. Id. at 462.
49. Id. at 462–66.
50. See id. at 456–57 (allowing agencies to change long-standing policies, but only if they
show that a “‘flip-flop’” is warranted (quoting N.Y. Council, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v.
Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985))).
51. Id. at 461.
52. The majority concluded that it could not even consider the possibility that fleeting
expletives were indecent because the FCC did not provide any evidence that fleeting expletives
are offensive. Id. at 460 n.10 (citing Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610, 626 (1986)
(“Agency deference has not come so far that we will uphold regulations whenever it is possible
to ‘conceive a basis’ for administrative action.”)). The majority stretches a bit when it contends
that the FCC has provided no basis for its new fleeting-expletives policy. The FCC explained
that it changed its policy because it concluded that non-literal uses of the F-Word are offensive
enough to be indecent. In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2,
2002 and Mar. 8, 2005 (Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299, 13,303–08 (2006).
53. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 458–61.
54. Remand Order, 21 F.C.C.R. at 13,308.
55. See Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 461 (“The FCC’s decision, however, is devoid of any
evidence that suggests a fleeting expletive is harmful, let alone establishes that this harm is
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explained that it acted in response to viewer complaints.56 Instead, all
the FCC did was claim that it was fulfilling its duty to protect viewers
from the “first blow” of offensive language.57 This prophylactic
explanation was insufficient, the majority held, to justify a policy that
58
did not completely protect viewers from televised expletives.
In dissent, Judge Leval argued that the majority improperly
stymied the FCC’s new fleeting-expletives policy by setting out too
59
onerous a reasoned-explanation requirement. Any reasoned
explanation should have sufficed, according to the dissent, including
60
one that was “sensible, although not necessarily compelling.”
Because the FCC reasonably concluded that the F-Word is always
graphically explicit enough to be indecent, the FCC’s new fleeting61
expletives policy should have survived administrative review. The
dissent found nothing in the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious test
barring the FCC from changing its fleeting-expletives policy and
charged the majority with striking down the FCC’s new policy
because of “a difference of opinion.”62

serious enough to warrant government regulation. Such evidence would seem to be particularly
relevant today when children likely hear this language far more often from other sources than
they did in the 1970s when the Commission first began sanctioning indecent speech.”); Jess
Bravin & Amy Schatz, Don’t Read His Lips—You Might Be Offended, WALL ST. J., Nov. 4,
2008,
at
A14,
available
at
http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB122575539538895001.html (“The FCC says . . . that it conducted no formal study beyond the
opinion it published announcing the expletive rule. A spokesman says the commission can't
comment further while the case is pending.”).
56. The failure to make this argument will hurt the FCC because, unlike rational-basis
review, courts “may not supply a reasoned basis for the agency’s action that the agency itself has
not given,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
The FCC would have an easier time passing the arbitrary-and-capricious test if it had used
viewer complaints to explain the policy change. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 36, FCC v.
Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (Nov. 4, 2008) (question of Souter, J.) (indicating that
the FCC’s new policy could have passed administrative review if it had said that it was changing
the policy in response to public complaint).
57. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 457–58. The FCC relied on this argument because it was taken
directly from the language of the Supreme Court’s Pacifica decision. See Remand Order, 21
F.C.C.R. at 13,309 (“[In Pacifica, the Supreme Court] rejected the argument that one could
protect oneself by turning off the broadcast upon hearing indecent language: ‘To say that one
may avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like
saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow.’ We believe that
granting an automatic exemption for ‘isolated or fleeting’ expletives unfairly forces viewers
(including children) to take ‘the first blow.’” (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726,
748–49 (1978))).
58. Fox v. FCC, 489 F.3d at 458.
59. Id. at 469–72, 473 (Leval, J., dissenting).
60. Id. at 469.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 473.
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V. ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit struck down the FCC’s fleeting-expletives
policy because it refused to presume that non-literal uses of the F63
Word were offensive enough to be indecent. The majority had a
reason to be leery of the FCC’s new policy (for decades, the FCC
64
refused to call fleeting expletives indecent ), but it did not have the
power to reject a policy based on the reasonable notion that the FWord is indecent. In administering the APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious
test, the majority had the authority only to determine whether the
FCC’s explanation fell within the bounds of reason.65 By requiring the
FCC to prove change was warranted, the majority shrank the bounds
of reason and made it harder for the FCC to pass administrative
review.
A. The APA
Congress enacted the APA in 1946 to impose “procedural
controls” on the newly-empowered federal agencies.66 In the
burgeoning administrative state, agencies like the FCC had sweeping
new powers delegated to them by Congress, and some had begun to
worry about “bureaucratic tyranny.”67 Congress enacted the APA to
ensure that agencies such as the FCC did the work it asked them to
68
do and stayed within the parameters that it set.
Congress pulled the judiciary into APA enforcement because
lawmakers lack the resources to effectively monitor compliance with

63. See id. at 461 (majority opinion) (demanding evidence that fleeting expletives are
harmful enough to “warrant” regulation).
64. Id.
65. See Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 1993) (upholding a rule
within the bounds of reasonableness—even though it is not necessarily a good rule, even though
it might go too far, and even though its costs may exceed its benefits—because the duty of “a
reviewing court of generalist judges is merely to patrol the boundary of reasonableness”).
66. Wald, supra note 33, at 222.
67. See Wald, supra note 33, at 221–23 (recounting the history of the APA); In re Industry
Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and Enforcement
Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 7999 (2001) (citing 47 U.S.C. §§
312(a)(6), 503(b)(1)(D)) (“Congress has given the Federal Communications Commission the
responsibility for administratively enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 1464. In doing so, the Commission may
revoke a station license, impose a monetary forfeiture, or issue a warning for the broadcast of
indecent material.”).
68. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (West 2007) (making illegal agency actions that were procedurally
improper or otherwise in violation of the agency’s authorizing statute); Wald, supra note 33, at
223 (pointing out that, when lawmakers enacted the APA, they did not intend to give the
judiciary the power to influence agency policy decisions).
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the APA.69 Though Congress gave the judiciary some power to watch
over the agencies, it limited the scope of the judiciary’s power to
review agency actions, in part because the judiciary had thwarted
70
early congressional efforts to empower federal agencies. Under the
APA, courts can stop agencies from stepping out of bounds or
violating a rule of procedure, but they cannot prevent agencies from
71
replacing a high-quality policy with a moderately-functional one. As
the referees of the administrative state, courts monitor agencies’
compliance with the rules but lack the power to set the rules
themselves.
B. The Reasoned Explanation
In Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, the Second Circuit majority
did more than referee the FCC: it reset the limits on the FCC’s rulemaking powers. The majority limited the FCC’s ability to change its
fleeting-expletives policy by presuming that fleeting expletives were
not indecent.72 With that single presumption, the FCC’s ability to
provide a reasoned explanation for the change shrank. The FCC could
no longer get through administrative review by concluding that nonliteral uses of the F-Word are offensive enough to be indecent. The
FCC needed more. It needed evidence that fleeting expletives are
harmful enough “to warrant government regulation.”73
To demand evidence from the FCC, the majority read the APA as
requiring special explanations from agencies trying to change longstanding policies.74 This reading of the APA sprang in large part from
69. The APA subjects all final agency actions to review. See 5 U.S.C.A. § 701(a) (allowing
judicial review except when the law precludes it or “agency action is committed to agency
discretion by law”). Only the judiciary has the capability to review final agency actions on a
case-by-case basis.
70. See Wald, supra note 33, at 222–23 (recounting the history of the APA and noting that
New Dealers worried that “an escalated level of judicial review” would allow the judiciary to
stymie regulation).
71. See supra note 65.
72. The majority actually comes close to holding that non-literal uses of the F-Word are
not indecent. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 459–60 (2d Cir. 2007), cert.
granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008). Classifying non-literal uses of the F-Word as indecent “defies
any commonsense understanding of these words,” according to the majority, because everybody
knows that such uses do not describe coitus. Id. at 459. In a footnote, the majority urges readers
not to think that it is agreeing with claims that the F-Word is not indecent. It does not
“disagree” with the notion that non-literal uses of the F-Word are indecent, it just wants the
FCC to provide “record evidence.” Id. at 460 n. 10.
73. Id. at 461.
74. The majority highlighted what it wanted from the FCC: “‘a reasoned explanation of
why the new rule effectuates the statute as well as or better than the old rule.’” Id. at 457
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a section of the Supreme Court’s Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Ass’n
v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., decision.75 There, the
Court stated that “an agency changing its course by rescinding a rule
is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that
which may be required when an agency does not act in the first
instance.”76 The Fox v. FCC majority was wrong to read State Farm as
setting out a special-explanation requirement for policy change, and
wrong to interpret the APA as permitting the judiciary to employ an
arbitrary-and-capricious test skeptical of otherwise-reasonable
change.
First, the majority incorrectly read State Farm as establishing a
different and more particular arbitrary-and-capricious test for
changes to long-standing policies. In State Farm, the Court did not
consider creating a different arbitrary-and-capricious test. Instead, the
Court answered a different question: Should deregulation be subject
77
to something less demanding than the arbitrary-and-capricious test?
The Court’s decision, which required deregulation to pass the
arbitrary-and-capricious test, shows that the APA sets out a single,
unwavering test for agency action.78
Second, the majority incorrectly interpreted the APA’s arbitraryand-capricious test as skeptical of otherwise-reasonable change. In
actuality, the APA provides agencies with “ample latitude” for change
by limiting courts to checking agency decisions to make sure they are
79
within the “boundary of reasonableness.” In the twenty-five years
since its State Farm decision, the Court has repeatedly held that
administrative law provides agencies with broad powers to change
their policies as they see fit.80 Although these decisions do not

(quoting N.Y. Council, Ass’n of Civilian Technicians v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 757 F.2d
502, 508 (2d Cir. 1985)).
75. The majority cites the pertinent section of State Farm when demanding evidence that
fleeting expletives are harmful. Id. at 461 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto.
Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983)).
76. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983).
77. Id. at 41–42.
78. See id. at 42 (“[T]he direction in which an agency chooses to move does not alter the
standard of judicial review established by law.”).
79. Id. at 42; Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 1993).
80. See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981
(2005) (recognizing agencies have broad power to change policies and indicating that agencies
might be able to change policies for political reasons); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S.
735, 740–41 (1996) (allowing an agency to change its 100-year-old interpretation of a statute
because Congress gave the agencies the discretion to do so); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 187
(1991) (allowing agency to change policies because it believed the “prior policy failed to
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expressly disavow skeptical applications of the arbitrary-andcapricious test, they strongly indicate that the Court will not adopt
such a limiting approach.
C. The F-Word
The dissent correctly asked if non-literal uses of the F-word could
reasonably be considered indecent.81 The answer to that question—
and that answer alone—should have determined whether the FCC
gave a reasoned explanation for its new fleeting-expletives policy.
The majority should have spent more time analyzing the F-Word
82
and less time knocking down all of the FCC’s other explanations.
The majority’s refusal to presume that fleeting expletives are indecent
was untenable, at least with respect to the F-Word.83 The F-Word
remains one of the most offensive words in the English language
84
because it is always freighted with “implicit sexual meaning.” The

implement properly the statute”); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 863–64 (1984) (“An initial agency interpretation is not instantly carved in stone. On
the contrary, the agency, to engage in informed rulemaking, must consider varying
interpretations and the wisdom of its policy on a continuing basis.”).
81. The majority does not consider this question at all. See Fox Television Stations, Inc. v.
FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 460 n. 10 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008) (claiming that
the Second Circuit “need not consider” that issue because the FCC did not provide any
evidence showing that non-literal expletives are offensive). The dissent considers this question
decisive. Id. at 469–70 (Leval, J., dissenting).
82. The majority correctly rejected the FCC’s other explanations for changing its fleetingexpletives policy. See id. at 458–61 (rejecting the FCC’s other explanations as inadequate). The
FCC’s “first blow” explanation was unconvincing. See id. at 458 (pointing out that a policy that
still allows expletives to be broadcast does not really protect viewers from the “first blow” of
expletives). The FCC was engaging in hyperbole when it claimed that it needed to prevent
fleeting expletives from overrunning the airwaves. See id. at 460–61 (calling the explanation
“divorced from reality because the Commission itself recognizes that broadcasters have never
barraged the airwaves with expletives”).
83. Because none of the judges on the Second Circuit panel that heard Fox v. FCC
believed that the word “shit” is offensive enough to be indecent, this analysis does not address
that claim. See id. at 459–60 (concluding that there is no evidence that fleeting utterances of the
word “shit” are offensive); id at 474 n.18 (concluding that “shit” is not indecent because a
reference to excrement is not as harmful to children as a reference to sex because young
children’s “main preoccupation” is excrement). The Second Circuit is probably correct: the
word “shit” is, according to one survey, merely the 17th-most offensive word in the English
language. ANDREA MILLWOOD-HARGRAVE, ADVER. STANDARDS AUTH., DELETE
EXPLETIVES? 9 (2000), http://www.asa.org.uk/asa/research/archive.
84. Robert F. Blomquist, The F-Word: A Jurisprudential Taxonomy of American Morals
(In a Nutshell), 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 65, 98 (1999); MILLWOOD-HARGRAVE, supra note
83, at 9; see also THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 683 (“Despite
the wideness and proliferation of its use in many sections of society, the word fuck remains (and
has been for centuries) one of the most taboo words in English.”); Christopher M. Fairman,
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majority had little, if any, evidence that the word had lost its taboo
power as more people use it in non-sexual ways.85 If anything, the
spread of non-literal uses of the F-Word might actually be a testament
86
to its offensive power. After all, Bono did not say “fucking brilliant”
because the F-Word was the most literal description of his feelings: he
said it because the F-Word accurately conveyed the intensity of his
feelings in a way that a less-offensive word (such as “darn”) could
not.87
Without the presumption that fleeting expletives are harmless, the
majority would have been forced to admit that the FCC acted
reasonably by declaring non-literal uses of the F-Word indecent.
Nobody, not even the broadcast networks, thinks that the F-Word
88
should be used on broadcast television. The reason: Many people
still consider the word extremely offensive.89 Thus, the F-Word
remains taboo enough to be presumptively indecent.90
VI. ARGUMENTS AND DISPOSITION
How reasonable is it to presume that the F-Word is indecent? If a
majority of the Supreme Court believes that it cannot presume that
the F-Word is offensive enough to be indecent, it will uphold the
Second Circuit’s decision. If, however, a majority of the Court believes
that the F-Word remains offensive enough to be indecent, the court
will overturn the Second Circuit’s decision. Either way, the Court

Fuck, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1711, 1712 n.3 (2007) (listing scholarship that reviews the
offensiveness of the F-Word).
85. See Bravin & Schatz, supra note 55, at A14 (quoting a linguist as saying that expletives
like “fuck” “have their own magic” and defy reasoned analysis); but see id. (noting that Michael
Powell, the former FCC chairman, regrets classifying non-literal uses of the F-Word as indecent
because “no reasonable person would believe” that such exclamations are “meant to titillate or
be sexual in nature”).
86. The FCC declared fleeting expletives indecent after Bono uttered this phrase on live
television. In re Complaints Against Various Broad. Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the
“Golden Globe Awards” Program (Golden Globes), 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4976–80 (2004).
87. Justice Scalia made this point during oral arguments. See Transcript of Oral Argument
at 35–36, supra note 56 (“[You] [d]on’t use golly waddles in—instead of the F-Word.”).
88. See In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and
Mar. 8, 2005 (Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299, 13,310 (2006) (surveying network policy on
expletives and finding that networks generally do not permit shows to use the F-Word, even
when those shows air during the “safe harbor” period when the FCC’s broadcast indecency
rules do not apply).
89. See id. at 13,306 n. 48 (quoting from e-mail complaining about Nicole Richie’s use of
the F-Word during the 2003 Billboard Music Awards).
90. See Bravin & Schatz, supra note 55, at A14 (quoting a linguist as saying, “These words
are taboo, and we as a society have invested ourselves in treating these words as taboo.”).
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does not appear inclined to use FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., to
decide if the FCC’s broadcast indecency regime is still constitutional.
Instead, the Court will probably send the constitutional questions
91
back to the Second Circuit for further constitutional arguments.
A. Examining Dirty Words
In evaluating the presumption that the F-Word is indecent, the
Court will examine the meaning of the F-Word. This examination will
92
93
honor the “narrow” scope of judicial review that the APA sets out.
The Court is tied to a narrow arbitrary-and-capricious test in part
because expanding the reasoned-explanation requirement would
require it to violate Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., and impose a new rule on agencies.94
If oral arguments were any indication, the justices will examine
the place of expletives in modern society before making their
decision: How do people use and understand the F-Word?95 Do
96
community standards still consider expletives offensive? What are
the costs of excising such expletives from television, especially
because a regime that strictly punishes fleeting expletives could make
live broadcasts infeasible?97 After examining these questions, the

91. See infra Part VI.B (explaining the constitutional arguments at issue).
92. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983).
93. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 32, supra note 56 (comments of Roberts, C.J.)
(“But the point—important point is whether or not they provided a reasonable explanation for
their current position.”).
94. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519,
524 (1978) (holding that Congress set the procedural requirements the judiciary can impose on
agencies, the judiciary cannot come up with new ones).
95. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, supra note 56 (question of Stevens, J.) (“Isn’t it
true that . . . [the F-Word] is a word that often is used with . . . no reference whatsoever to the
. . . sexual connotation?”); compare Brief for the Petitioners at 34–35, FCC v. Fox Television
Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (U.S. June 2, 2008) (arguing that the F-Word retains its sexual
connotations, even when it is used in a non-literal way) with Brief for Respondent Fox
Television Stations, Inc., at 41–42, FCC v. Fox, No. 07-582 (U.S. Aug. 1, 2008) (arguing that
non-literal uses of the F-Word are not explicit, graphic, pandering, or titillating, and that people
understand when the F-Word is being used in a non-literal way).
96. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, supra note 56 (question of Kennedy, J.) (asking
if community standards have changed so that people are more tolerant of curse words).
97. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 18–20, supra note 56. (“I just have a practical
question. I’m just curious about this. What are the networks supposed to do, or the television
stations? They cover a lot of live events.”); see also Brief for Respondent Fox Television
Stations, Inc. at 32, supra note 95 (pointing out that the record before the court is “replete with
examples of how the new policy has jeopardized the viability of live broadcasting”).
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Court could very well decide that it was reasonable to declare nonliteral uses of the F-Word indecent.
Unlike the Second Circuit, there are a significant number of
justices on the Supreme Court who will begin their analysis by
presuming that reasonable people consider the F-Word offensive,
98
regardless of how it is used. These justices will not need proof that
the F-Word is harmful to uphold the FCC’s fleeting-expletives policy;
instead, they will presume that the FCC’s fleeting-expletives policy is
reasonable until Fox proves otherwise. If a majority of the Court
adopts this approach, the Court will almost certainly uphold the
FCC’s new fleeting-expletives policy. The Court has little evidence
that people distinguish non-literal from literal uses of the F-Word,99
and what little evidence it does have is outweighed by the cries of
indecency coming from television viewers and Congress.100
Perhaps in an effort to get around this problem, Fox has tried
unsuccessfully to convince the Court that the APA requires more
explanation from the FCC than normal because the new fleeting101
expletives policy regulates constitutionally-protected speech. At
oral argument, the justices voiced doubt about this constitutional98. During oral arguments, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia articulated this view.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–14, 34–36, supra note 56. Justice Souter also indicated
support for this view by saying that the spike in indecency complaints would have been enough
to justify the fleeting expletives crackdown. Id. at 36–37. Justice Alito and Justice Thomas might
agree with these three justices, though it is not publicly known: neither justice spoke during oral
arguments.
99. The Second Circuit cited explicit comments by President Bush (“get Syria to get
Hezbollah to stop doing this shit”) and Vice President Cheney (“[f]uck yourself”) as evidence
that the people with a “commonsense understanding” of the words can distinguish between
literal and non-literal uses of the words. Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. FCC, 489 F.3d 444, 459–
60 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008). In doing so, the Second Circuit might
have actually proved how hard it is to distinguish between the literal and non-literal uses of the
F-Word. As the FCC tactfully points out, “at least one of the expletives at issue”—Cheney’s—
“was used in a literal sense.” Brief for the Petitioners at 34, supra note 95.
100. Beginning in 2003, the FCC recorded a marked increase in indecency complaints. See
Indecency Complaints and NALs: 1993–2006, supra note 14 (showing that the FCC received
327,198 complaints in the first six months of 2006). Viewers who heard fleeting expletives
complained to the FCC about the “vulgarity” and the “disgusting and very disturbing” language.
In re Complaints Regarding Various Television Broads. Between Feb. 2, 2002 and Mar. 8, 2005
(Remand Order), 21 F.C.C.R. 13,299, 13,306 n.48 (2006). Others complained that their children
started asking questions such as “what f***ing meant.” Brief for the Petitioners at 26, supra
note 95. Congress responded by increasing the fines for broadcast indecency. Broadcast
Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, 47 U.S.C.A. § 503(b) (West Supp. Oct. 2006). In a House
Report on the bill, the fleeting expletives uttered by Bono and Nicole Richie were used as
evidence of the need for legislation. H.R. Rep. No. 109-5, at 2 (2005).
101. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38, supra note 56; Brief for Respondent Fox Television
Stations, Inc. at 21–23, supra note 95.
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avoidance approach.102 They appeared unwilling to create a separate
arbitrary-and-capricious test for constitutionally-questionable agency
decisions, and some justices indicated that creating such a test would
103
violate Vermont Yankee by imposing a new rule on agencies.
B. Stopping Short of the Constitution
The constitutional concerns about the FCC’s new policy do not
disappear simply because the Court does not factor them in to its
104
administrative review. They remain an “elephant . . . in the room.” In
an era of YouTube and digital cable, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation’s
105
dated claim that broadcast television is “uniquely pervasive” and
106
“uniquely accessible to children” rings hollow. Not even the Court
thinks this is true anymore,107 largely because it realizes that cable
108
reaches nearly as many homes as broadcast television.
Nothing in the doctrine of stare decisis requires the Court to cling
to the Pacifica decision. Pacifica’s analog world is gone. Cable and the
internet now flood American homes with images and content that
109
used to trickle in through the broadcast airwaves. The drastic
changes in media over the last thirty years provide the Court with
110
111
more than enough “special justification” to overrule the decision.
Though the Court could use FCC v. Fox to begin overhauling its
constitutional approach to broadcast indecency regulation, it will

102. Transcript of Oral Argument at 38–41, supra note 56.
103. Id.
104. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, supra note 56 (comment by Ginsberg, J.).
105. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978).
106. Id. at 749.
107. See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744–45
(1996) (recognizing that cable is as pervasive and accessible to children as broadcast television,
“if not more so”).
108. About 87 percent of all American households now have cable or satellite service. FCC,
FCC Adopts 13th Annual Report to Congress on Video Competition and Notice of Inquiry for
the 14th Annual Report, at 3, Nov. 27, 2007, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/
attachmatch/DOC-278454A1.pdf (estimating that 95.8 million of the 110.2 million American
households with a television have cable or satellite service).
109. Cf. Transcript of Oral Argument at 17, supra note 56 (comment of Ginsberg, J.) (“That
was before the Internet. Pacifica was in 1978.”).
110. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984).
111. The Court can deviate more from prior precedent in constitutional cases, in part
because the only other way to alter the Court’s prior constitutional interpretation is to amend
the Constitution itself. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235–36 (1997). Even so, “any departure
from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification.” Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212. The
Court recognizes that it can overturn prior precedent when facts change enough to rob the old
rule of its foundation. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 855 (1992).
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probably not do so. The court limited the question presented in FCC
v. Fox to administrative law,112 and has not agreed to consider the
broadcasters’ constitutional challenge to the FCC’s broadcast
113
indecency regime. Remand is likely in part because the delay will
not hurt the broadcasters’ claims,114 and in part because the Solicitor
General specifically requested remand so the FCC could get “another
115
crack at those issues before the Second Circuit.” Because there are
no special reasons for taking up the broadcasters’ constitutional
challenge immediately, the Court will probably send the case back to
116
the Second Circuit for further arguments.
Remand might be particularly appropriate in FCC v. Fox because
a decision reconsidering Pacifica could have huge cultural
ramifications. If the Court drops the constitutional distinction
between broadcast and cable, the FCC’s current broadcast indecency
117
regime could be unconstitutional. The FCC would lose its ability to
tell broadcasters what they could air, and viewers would have to filter
118
out offensive material themselves. Such changes could cause a

112. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582,
at I (U.S. Nov. 1, 2007), cert. granted 128 S. Ct. 1647 (2008) (setting out a question presented
that asks “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in striking down the Federal Communications
Commission’s determination that the broadcast of vulgar expletives may violate federal
restrictions on the broadcast of ‘any obscene, indecent, or profane language,’ . . . when the
expletives are not repeated”). The Second Circuit did not make any constitutional holdings, so
the Court’s review is presumably limited to examining the Second Circuit’s administrative law
holdings.
113. Brief for Respondent Fox Television Stations, Inc. at 42–48, supra note 95.
114. The Second Circuit predicted that the networks would continue to litigate “these
precise issues” as long as the FCC pursued a restrictive policy on fleeting expletives. Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. Fox, 489 F.3d 444, 462 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 1647
(2008).
115. Transcript of Oral Argument at 28, supra note 56.
116. The Court could read its rules as requiring it to remand the constitutional question
because it was not set out in the questions presented. See SUP. CT. R. 14.1(a) (“Only questions
set out in the petition, or fairly included therein, will be considered by the Court.”). The Court
could also read its prior rulings as requiring remand because the Second Circuit addressed the
broadcasters’ constitutional challenge in dicta. See Black v. Cutter Labs., 351 U.S. 292, 297
(1956) (“This Court, however, reviews judgments, not statements of opinion.”).
117. Cf. United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 824–27 (2000) (holding
rules limiting the times of pornographic cable broadcasts unconstitutional because they were not
narrowly tailored); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 866–74 (1997) (providing the internet with full
First Amendment protections and striking down indecency regulations as unconstitutionally
vague).
118. The Court has held that the FCC cannot regulate speech on cable television if lessrestrictive technological alternatives such as content filters are available. Playboy, 529 U.S. at
815–16. Viewers can now use a number of content filters to regulate what airs in their homes.
Perhaps the most important content filter is the V-Chip, which now comes installed in every
television with a screen bigger than 13 inches. See In re Technical Requirements to Enable
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national stir, 119 raise Congress’ hackles,120 and ultimately lead people
to accuse the Court of coarsening the nation by opening the public
airwaves to dirty words.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Court’s FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., decision will have
“an air of futility”121 if it upholds a FCC rule on administrative
grounds that, upon further examination, could be unconstitutional.
Even with a whiff of futility about it, the FCC v. Fox decision will be
important. The APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious test has been twisted
to retard change,122 and Court needs to correct that bastardization of
the test. Congress gave the judiciary the power to watch over agencies
because it wanted the courts to make sure that the agencies honored
the limits on their power. When patrolling those boundaries, the
judiciary should also honor the limits on its own power. The APA sets
up a system where the courts are referees, not rule-makers. The
Court’s decision in FCC v. Fox should reinforce that fundamental
principle.

Blocking of Video Programming Based on Program Ratings, 13 F.C.C.R. 11,248, 11,256–57
(1998) (requiring all qualifying televisions made after January 1, 2000, to contain V-Chips). VChips and digital video recorders provide the FCC with a less-restrictive alternative to
broadcast speech regulations.
119. A significant number of people still rely on the FCC to keep indecency programming
off the air. Cf. Indecency Complaints and NALs: 1993–2006, supra note 14 (showing that the
FCC received 327,198 complaints in the first six months of 2006). Because an entire “generation
of American parents” relies on the FCC to help shield their children from indecency, overruling
Pacifica could upset the country’s “settled expectations.” Reply Brief for the Petitioners at 21–
22, FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., No. 07-582 (U.S. Sept. 3, 2008).
120. As recently as 2005, Congress supported more onerous broadcast indecency
regulations. See Broadcast Decency Enforcement Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-235, 120 Stat. 491
(codified at 47 U.S.C.A. § 503 (West Supp. Oct. 2006)) (increasing indecency fines).
121. Transcript of Oral Argument at 27, supra note 56 (comment by Ginsberg, J.).
122. The contents of the arbitrary-and-capricious test set out by § 706(2) of the APA are
“indeterminate,” and that allows outcome-oriented judges to manipulate the scope of review to
achieve their preferred ends. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 33 at 1065–68, 1072.

